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In conclusion, it is submitted that the court in Manor Drug
should have f011owed its analytically more precise decision in Mount
Clemens and concluded that the non-purchasing plaintiffs had no
standing to sue.
LARRY E. BERGMANN
Securities—Attorney's Opinion Letter in an Unregistered Sale
—Standard of Culpability in SEC Injunction Action—SEC v. Spec-
trum, Ltd. 1—In an action by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) to enjoin twelve defendants from further alleged viola-
tions of the federal securities laws in connection with the illegal sale
of unregistered securities, 2
 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit 'reversed the district court's denial of an
injunction3
 in the case of defendant-appellee Stuart Schiffman---an
attorney who prepared an opinion letter on the basis of which some
of the unregistered securities allegedly were sold—and remanded for
an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent of his role in the
scheme. 4
 The Second Circuit further directed that, should Schiff-
man be found liable as an aider and abettor of the scheme, the
standard of culpability to be applied would be that of negligence. 5
The Spectrum case involves a particularly complex fact situa-
tion and a large cast of characters; it is therefore necessary to outline
in perhaps greater than usual detail the events leading up to the
suit. On April 2, 1971 the SEC filed a complaint charging Spectrum,
Ltd. (Spectrum), appellee Schiffman, and ten other defendants with
participation in a scheme to distribute unregistered shares of Spec-
trum in violation of the registration provisions of the Securities Act
' 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
R The SEC obtained permanent injunctions against at least ten of the defendants, but
was unsuccessful in obtaining a preliminary injunction against defendant-appellee Schiffman.
Id. at 536. The SEC derives its authority to obtain injunctions from section 20(b) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77t(b) (1970), and section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). The purpose of such injunctive relief is to prevent
further violations of the securities laws by defendants.
The typical SEC fraud injunction restrains the defendant from making any
untrue statement of a material fact concerning a number of specific matters, or any
untrue statement of a material fact similar to those statements specifically set forth or
of similar purport or object. And the typical injunction under § 5 of the Securities
Act restrains any further offers or sales of any securities in violation of the registra-
tion or prospectus requirement, with an explicit exception normally for exempted
securities or transactions.
3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1978 (2d ed. 1961) (footnote omitted). Such relief does not
usually affect defendants' criminal or private civil liability.
3
 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 93,631, at 92,868 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
489 F,2d at 541, 543.
5
 Id, at 541.
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of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 6 antifraud provisions of both the 1933 Ace
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 8 and SEC
Rule 1013-5. 9 The purpose of the scheme was to distribute and sell to
the public and others over one million unregistered shares of Spec-
trum common stock in order to obtain monies to be used to pay off
debts incurred by several of the defendants.'° The scheme com-
prised several stages, the first of which commenced on November
6 Section 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U,S.C, § 77e (1970), provides in pertinent part:
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly—
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communica-
tion in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or
medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce,
by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of
sale or for delivery after sale, ,
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communications in interstate commerce or
of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as
to such security ..
7 Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
a Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U, S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). 15 U.S.C. § 78j provides in
pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules or
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) (Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,• by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
I° [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L, Rep. 	 93,631, at 92,864.
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10, 1969, when Westward Investment Corporation (Westward),
controlled by defendant Louis Marder, was merged into Spectrum,
which then issued a large block of unregistered common stock in
exchange for all issued and outstanding Westward shares. The
merger and subsequent stock issuance was intended to avoid the
registration requirement of section 5(c) of the 1933 Act" by means
of an exemption from section 5 under SEC Rule 133, 12 which
provided that the exchange of shares between a surviving corpora-
tion and the shareholders of a disappearing corporation in the course
of a merger would not be considered a "sale" under section 5.
The next step was to comply with section 4(1) of the 1933 Act,"
which provides that the recipients of unregistered stock, such as that
received in the Westward-Spectrum merger, could dispose of it
without the filing of a registration statement provided that such
recipient-sellers were not issuers, underwriters, or dealers under the
Act." Since Marder, as a controlling shareholder of Westward, was
classified as an underwriter by Rule 133, 35 he was not qualified for
exemption from "registrationrequirements. Therefore, prior to the
merger Marder began distributing some of his Westward shares to
various friends, who were exempt from registration requirements by
section 4(1), 16
 and who in many cases were in fact unaware of their
status as Westward shareholders." By obtaining stock powers from
these persons, Marder came into actual control of over one million
Spectrum shares then issued and outstanding. Following the
merger, he intended to sell the Spectrum stock these friends would
receive, thus appearing to meet the criteria of a section 4(1) registra-
' 1
 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1970).,For the text of this section, see note 6 supra.
12
 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1973), rescinded (with certain stated exceptions), 37 Fed. Reg.
23,636 (1972) (effective Jan. 1, 1973). Rule 133 has been replaced by Rule 145, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.145 (1973), which no longer provides a registration exemption for securities issued in the
course of a merger.
' 3
 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970). The section provides in pertinent part that "[t]he provisions
of section 77e of this title [section 5 of the 1933 Act] shall not apply to—(1) transactions by any
person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer. . . ."
14
 The terms issuer, underwriter and dealer aredefined in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(4), (11) and
(12) (1970) respectively.
' 5
 The Rule provided in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who is an affiliate of a constituent corporation [Westward] at the
time any transaction [otherwise qualifying for an exemption under this Rule] is
submitted to a vote of the stockholders of such corporation, who acquires securities
of the issuer in connection with such transaction with a vies  to the distribution
thereof shall be deemed to be an underwriter of such securities within the meaning of
section 2(11) of the Act.
17 C.F.R. § 230.133(c) (1973), However, even if Marder had not been a controlling share-
holder, an exemption under Rule 133 was still not available because such exemption was
conditioned on approval of the merger by the disappearing corporation's shareholders and no
such vote was taken.
16
 Since neither the district court nor the Second Circuit indicated otherwise, it can be
inferred that the friends to whom Marder distributed the stock were not issuers, underwriters
or dealers.
17
 489 F.2d at 538.
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tion exemption." At this point, several of the defendants, including
Marder, began "dumping" hundreds of thousands of the unregis-
tered Spectrum shares onto the market in the United States and
Canada.' 9
On the day of the merger, Spectrum's general counsel, Morton
Berger, wrote an opinion letter 2° instructing Spectrum's transfer
agent on the proper classification of the securities to be issued. The
letter included Berger's opinion that the merger itself complied with
the requirements of Rule 133, and that certain recipients of the
newly-issued Spectrum stock should receive shares marked "re-
stricted," i.e., not for public sale, because those former Westward
-,shareholders, whom Berger listed 'by name in the letter, were consi-
dered to be "underwriters" under Rule 133. 21 Berger also stated that
the remaining former Westward shareholders, including the persons
to whom Marder had transferred Westward shares, could be issued
unrestricted shares. These persons were not listed by name in the
opinion letter; however, two weeks later Berger wrote a letter to the
president of Spectrum, in which he specified those persons who had
received unrestricted shares of Spectrum stock pursuant to the
merger. 22
In late November Schiffman entered the picture at the request
of defendant Michael Gardner, a principal at the registered broker-
dealer firm of Gardner Securities, to whom Marder had delivered
for sale 125,000 shares of unrestricted Spectrum stock nominally
owned by William and John Doyen. Gardner viewed Berger's two
letters as constituting an insufficient basis on which to sell the
securities since the opinion letter did not specify the persons to
whom unrestricted stock was issued and the second letter, in which
the 'names were listed, was not an opinion letter. Gardner asked
Berger to prepare an opinion letter certifying that the Doyens' stock
was exempt from registration, but Berger refused to issue such a
19 Id.
19 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,631, at 92,865. The term
"dumping" is used colloquially to describe the process of distributing large amounts of
securities to the public, sometimes at low prices.
2° For an extensive practical discussion of opinion letters and attorneys' liability, see
Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transtictions—An Attempt to Bring Some Order out of
Some Chaos, 28 Bus. Law. 915 (1973). Fuld defines a "legal opinion" as
a written opinion delivered by a lawyer to his own client to enable the client to
decide whether to take certain action, or at the request of his client delivered to
another party to the transaction as a condition precedent to the closing of that
transaction, or at the request of his client delivered to a government agency or other
third party. The term also includes an opinion requested by a client and intended to
be referred to in a prospectus or in an annual financial report.
Id. at 915-16.
21 See notes 12 and 15 supra. For the statutory definition of "underwriter," see text at
note 30 infra.
22 489 F.2d at 538. This second letter was not in the form of an opinion letter. Id. The
purpose for which it was written is unclear since the district court made no finding on this
point.
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letter on behalf of any stockholder. Gardner then contacted Schiff-
man.
Schiffman's actions at this point are the subject of dispute
among the parties. 23
 Schiffman claimed that he spoke to one of the
Doyens on the phone in Gardner's office and, after being shown
Berger's two letters, agreed to write an opinion letter for Doyen in
which he would "verify" Berger's opinion. 24
 Gardner, on the other
hand, claimed that Schiffman met Marder and defendant James
Morse in his office, and that Marder asked Schiffman to write an
opinion letter to be used in a securities sale by Marder and Morse.
Schiffman then met with Berger—so Schiffman claimed—to learn
more about the Spectrum stock fOr the sale of which he had agreed
to write an opinion letter. Berger claimed that he warned Schiffman
that he "suspected that this stock . . . was going to be traded by a
control person and therefore the stock should not be freely
traded." 25
 Schiffman denied that Berger gave him such a warning. 26
Following his meeting with Berger, Schiffman issued an opin-
ion letter dated December 4 which closely paralleled the Berger
opinion letter of November 10, but which also included the names
of the shareholders, listed in Berger's second letter, who could sell
their Spectrum stock without registration. Although the letter was
addressed to one of the Doyens, 27
 it was delivered to Gardner's
office since Schiffman never received Doyen's address. 28 On De-
cember 8, Schiffman sent another letter to Doyen through Gardner's
office, stating that the letter of December 4 was not to be for
the sale of unregistered Spectrum stock. The letter of December 4
had carried no such warning. 29
The SEC charged Schiffman with being an "underwriter"
within the meaning of section 2(11) of the 1933 Act. This section
provides that
[t]he term "underwriter" means any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells
for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any
security, or participates or has a direct or indirect partici-
pation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a
participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any
such undertaking . . . . As used in this paragraph the term
"issuer" shall include, in addition to an issuer, any person
2' Id.
24
 Id. at 539.
" Id.
26 Id.
2' Neither the district court nor the Second Circuit specified to which Doyen the letter
was addressed.
26
 489 F.2d at 539. The district court found "some conflict as to whether Doyen was the
client or whether it was Gardner who had Doyen's stock to dispose of." [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec: L. Rep. V 93,631, at 92,866.
29
 489 F.2d at 539-40.
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directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer,
or any person under direct or, indirect common control
with the issuer. 3 °
Schiffman was claimed to have directly or indirectly participated in
the distribution of securities from an "issuer" (Marder) to the
public. 3 ' Although the SEC alleged that the December 4 letter had
been used in January 1970 in a sale of unregistered Spectrum stock
by Marder, no evidence was introduced to support the claim. 32 The
SEC further claimed that even if Schiffman was not liable as an
underwriter, he was nonetheless liable as an aider and abettor to the
scheme as a whole." The district court found no evidence to sup-
port a finding that Schiffman was liable as an aider and abettor. 34
The court applied the following standard of culpability:
[B]efore one may be deemed an aider and abettor to any
scheme, he must have knowledge of the improper scheme
and must perform or neglect to perform an act the perfor-
mance or omission of which is necessary to the furtherance
of the scheme with the purpose of furthering the scheme. 35
En route to denying the SEC's request for a preliminary injunction
,to enjoin Schiffman from further violations, the court noted that,
while Schiffman
3° 15 U.S.C. 5 77b(11) (1970).
31 The Second Circuit declined "to decide whether the extent of Schiffman's alleged
participation in the scheme would be sufficient to qualify him as an 'underwriter'" because
the record was "unclear." 489 F.2d at 541 n.11. Although the court noted that the term
"underwriter" had been "broadly defined to include anyone who directly or indirectly partici-
pates in a distribution of securities from an 'issuer' (Marder) to the public," id., it is question-
able whether the author of an opinion letter who is otherwise unconnected with the illicit sale
could or should be considered an underwriter. The district court in Spectrum noted that the
SEC had submitted no authority that "the mere preparation of an opinion letter is sufficient to
make the preparer an 'underwriter'." [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
¶ 93,631, at 92,867. The few cases in which parties other than obvious ones are deemed to be
"underwriters" have so far included within the term only those persons who participated in
some way in an actual transfer of securities, and not those who in some peripheral way may
have influenced the sale. See cases collected at 15 U.S.C.A. § 775, notes 9-17 (1974).
32 489 F.2d at 540.
33
 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,631, at 92,867. Schiffman's
role as an aider and abettor—should it be found that securities had indeed been sold on the
basis of the representations contained in his letter of Dec. 4—would be analogous to that in
criminal law of an accessory before the fact. See W. LaFave Sr A. Scott, Criminal Law 498
(1972). Liability for alders and abettors in SEC injunctive actions was borrowed from
criminal law and first recognized in SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D, Cal. 1939).
The court noted that
[p]ersons charged with aiding and abetting a criminal offense in violation of Sec.
17(a) [of the 1933 Act] may be joined as defendants, and no good reason appears why
this same rule should not apply in an injunctive proceeding to restrain a violation of
the same statute.
Id. at 43 (footnote omitted).
34
 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 93,631, at 92,868.
35
 Id. at 92,867-68, citing SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 195
(N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
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may have been guilty of some negligence in preparing the
opinion letter, thete is insufficient evidence to support any-
thing more serious than that. Furthermore, there has been
no showing that, unless enjoined, Schiffman is likely to
run afoul of the law in the future. 36 .
The Second Circuit, finding a highly material factual conflict
regarding Schiffman's role in the scheme, reversed and remanded
for an evidentiary hearing. In discussing the standard of culpability
the district court should apply to Schiffman should he be found
liable as an aider and abettor, the court HELD: the district court's-
_ standard of actual knowledge of the improper scheme plus an intent
to further that scheme was an improper departure from the negli-
gence standard repeatedly held to be sufficient in the context of
enforcement proceedings seeking equitable or prophylactic relief. 37
This note will examine the above holding in the light of the
growing administrative and judicial recognition of attorneys' re-
sponsibility to the public in - the securities field and will compare the
standard of culpability enunciated in Spectrum to that previously
applied by the Second Circuit in SEC injunctive actions. It will be
submitted that the Second Circuit, while correctly recognizing the
key role lawyers play in securities transactions through their opinion
letters, couched its opinion in language which raises an inference of
a standard of culpability that unnecessarily goes beyond that previ-
ously established in the Second Circuit, and which, it is submitted,
the court did not intend to imply.
The suggestion that attorneys in the securities field have a duty
to the public is hardly revolutionary. 38
 The SEC's concern with the
reliability of attorneys' opinion letters in sales of unregistered se-
curities is one of long standing. A 1962 SEC release stated that
[o]bviously, an attorney's opinion based on hypothetical
facts is worthless if the facts are not .
	 . considered.
Because of this, it is the practice of responsible counsel not
36
 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 411 93,631, at 92,868. It was not
disputed that Schiffman had never before prepared an opinion letter. Id. at 92,867. The
Second Circuit noted, however, that subsequent to the argument in the district court Schiff-
man had been enjoined from further violations of the securities laws in two other cases and'
had pleaded guilty to a third violation. The Second Circuit saw "no reason for precluding the
SEC from introducing this evidence" on remand on the issue of "whether the defendant
[Schiffman] has the propensity to commit future violations . . . ." 489 F.2d at 542. There
appear to be differences among the circuits regarding the standard under which SEC injunc-
tions should be granted. See Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigation and the Molding of .
Remedies, 29 Bus. Law. 121 (1974), citing as examples SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F.
Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part & remanded, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.
1973), and SEC v. First American Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973).
37
 489 F.2d at 541, citing SEC v, Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d
Cir. 1972); Hardy v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphiir Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
3 ' See Douglas, The Lawyer and the Federal Securities Act, 3 Duke B. Ass'n J. 66
(1935); Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1934).
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to furnish an opinion concerning the availability of an
exemption from registration under the Securities Act for a
contemplated distribution unless such counsel have them-
selves carefully examined all of the relevant circumstances
and satisfied themselves, to the extent possible, that the
contemplated transaction is, in fact, not a part of an un-
lawful distribution. Indeed, if an attorney furnishes an
opinion based solely upon hypothetical facts which he has
made no effort to verify, and if he knows that his opinion
will be relied upon as the basis for a substantial distribu-
tion of unregistered securities, a serious question arises as
to the propriety of his professional conduct. 39
This view was recently reemphasized in a speech by SEC Commis-
sioner A.A. Sommer, in which he pointed out that
[attorneys] are frequently called upon to give opinions with
respect, principally, to the availability of exemptions from
the requirements for registration and use of a statutory
prospectus. None would deny, the importance of these
opinions: millions upon millions of dollars of securities
have been put into the channels of commerce—not just
sold once, but permanently into the trading markets—in
reliance upon little more than the professional judgment of
an attorney. 4 °
The abuse potential in opinion letters has been recognized by the
judiciary as well. In United States v. Benjamin, 4 ' the Second Cir-
cuit had stated that "[i]n our complex society the accountant's
certificate and the lawyer's opinion can.be instruments for inflicting
pecuniary loss mbre potent than the chisel or the crowbar." 42 Thus,
the Second Circuit in Spectrum was simply following the map
already drawn by the SEC and itself in regard to attorneys' respon-
sibilities in the securities field when it said:
The legal profession plays a unique and pivotal role in the
effective implementation of the securities laws. Questions
of compliance with the intricate provisions of these statutes
are ever present and the smooth functioning of the se-
curities markets will be seriously disturbed if the public
cannot rely. on the expertise proffered by an attorney when
he renders an opinion on such matters. . . .
39 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721)
(Feb. 2, 1962), 17 C.F.R. § 231.4445 (§ 241.6721), 27 Fed. Reg. 1251, 1251-52 (1962)
(emphasis added).
4) Address by Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jan. 1974, entitled "The Emerging Respon-
sibilities of the Securities Lawyer," reprinted in [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 79,631, at 83,688 [hereinafter cited as Sommer].
4' 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
42 328 F.2d at 863.
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. . . In the distribution of unregistered securities, the
preparation of an opinion letter is too essential and the
reliance of the public too high to permit due diligence to be
cast aside in the name of convenience. The public trust
demands more of its legal advisors than "customary" ac-
tivities which prove to be careless. 43
But despite the pre-Spectrum warning signals, the implications
of the language of the SEC and the courts as regards the practicing
securities lawyer did not become generally apparent until the filing
of the complaint in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp." in
February 1972. 45
 Among the defendants named in the complaint
were two prestigious law firms, 46 White & Case of New York and
Lord, Bissell & Brook of Chicago, and partners thereof. The SEC,
seeking injunctive relief, alleged against National Student Market-
ing Corporation (NSMC), its officers, directors, independent au-
ditors, and outside legal counsel (White & Case), and the officers,
directors, and legal advisors (Lord, Bissell & Brook) of Interstate
National Corporation (Interstate), a company which was merged
into NSMC, violations and aiding and abetting in violations of
antifraud, 47 proxy" and reporting" provisions of the securities
laws. Although the complaint covered numerous transactions be-
tween 1968 and 1970, the principal claim against the lawyers in-
volved the issuance of opinion letters at the closing of the NSMC-
Interstate merger. In the spring and summer of 1969, Interstate had
explored the possibility of merging with NSMC, and in August
1969, its directors executed a merger agreement, subject to the
approval of its stockholders. 5° Under the terms of the agreement
Interstate was to receive from NSMC's counsel (White & Case) an
43
 489 F.2d at 541-42. -
44
 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973). The case has not as yet been decided on the merits.
Thus while it is apparent that the SEC intends to seek enforcement of securities lawyers'
responsibilities to the public, it is by no means clear what the precise parameters of those
responsibilities will be. Two other recent cases in which the SEC has sought injunctions
against. law firms and their members, among other defendants, are SEC v. Allegheny
Beverage Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,183 (D.D.C. 1973), and
SEC v. Vesco, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,777 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), as has been noted in Cooney, The Implications of the Revolution in Securities
Regulation for Lawyers, 29 Bus. Law. 129 (1974).
45
 Complaint, SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp.. 284 (D.D.C.
1973), reprinted in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec, L. Rep. ¶ 93,360, at 91,913
(D,D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
46
 Complaint, supra note 45, at 91,913 to 91,913-2. As Commissioner Sommer noted, up
to the filing of the complaint in National Student Marketing "many attorneys had read the
travails of other less well-known counsel with the thought that these were not really relevant
because of their obscurity and the absence of recognition of their firms as expert and
knowledgeable . . ." Sommer, supra note 40, at 83,687.
47
 See notes 7-9 supra.
4° Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
49
 Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1970).
511
 360 F. Supp. at 288-89.
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opinion letter satisfactory to. Interstate's counsel (Lord, Bissell &
Brook) stating that NSMC had taken all actions required of it by
law and that all transactions in connection with the merger had
been duly and validly undertaken; NSMC would receive from Lord,
Bissell & Brook a similar letter satisfactory to White & Case,
affirming that Interstate had taken all necessary steps to effectuate
the merger in accordance with law. 5 ' In addition, Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. (PMM), NSMC's independent accountants, were to
issue a "comfort letter"52 to Interstate stating that there was no
reason to believe that NSMC's unaudited nine month financial
statements for the period ending May 31, 1969 were not prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting procedures or that
any material adjustments in these financials were required. 53 The
letter would also indicate that NSMC had experienced no material
change in its financial position from May 31 until five days prior to
the merger. 54 The unaudited nine month financial statements of
NSMC had been among the proxy materials sent to Interstate stock-
holders seeking their approval of the merger, and reflected a profit
of approximately $700,000. 55 The shareholders of both corporations
approved the merger in early October, and the closing meeting was
held at the offices of White & Case in New York on October' 31.
During the meeting, PMM dictated over the telephone from its
Washington, D.C. office an unsigned draft of its comfort letter;
however, instead of confirming, as expected, that the financial
statements were satisfactory, PMM reported that several significant
adjustments should be made retroactively to May 31. 56 PMM then
allegedly informed White & Case prior to the consummation of the
merger that it desired to add to the draft letter an additional para-
graph which would indicate that NSMC had not made a profit but
rather had suffered a net loss as of May 31, and that the company
would only break even as to net earnings for the year ending August
31. It was further alleged that White & Case did not inform the
others present at the meeting of this information. 57
Despite the unexpected information disclosed in the comfort
letter, the closing was consummated and the articles of merger filed
and recorded. Final copies of the comfort letter were received by
Id. at 289.
52 The accountant's comfort letter—more formally known as a "cold comfort letter"—is
often required as part of a closing in a transaction in cases where the most recent financial
statements have not yet been auditedf:The comfort letter, which purports to do no more than
convey the idea that no significant financial changes have occurred since the last audit that
might affect the transaction, is not an opinion letter; the standards of investigation are lower
in a comfort letter, which is often based on nothing more than conversations with manage.
ment and undetailed examination of unaudited financials.
53 360 F. Supp. at 289.
54 Id,
55 Id .
56
 Id. at 289-90.
57 Id. at 290.
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White & Case approximately one hour after the closing and by the
Interstate representatives several days later." The final letter in-
cluded two paragraphs indicating that NSMC Would merely break
even for the year ending August 31 and that PMM believed the
companies should consider submitting corrected interim unaudited
financial information to the shareholders prior to closing. 59 After
receiving the comfort letter, both counsels,' as required by the
merger agreement, rendered legal opinions that all transactions-un-
dertaken in connection with the merger had been duly and validly
undertaken. 60
The SEC complaint specifically claimed that
[a]s part of the fraudulent scheme White & Case,
Epley [White & Case partner], Lord, Bissell & Brook,
Meyer and Schauer [Lord, Bissell & Brook partners] failed
to refuse to issue their opinions . . . and failed to insist that
the financial statements be revised and shareholders be
resolicited, and failing that, to cease representing their
respective clients and, under the circumstances, notify the
plaintiff Commission concerning the misleading nature of
the nine month financial statements."
The idea, emerging from the complaint, that a lawyer should
resign, and even further that he should report his client to the SEC
should he be unable to stop his client's illegal conduct, greatly
disturbed the legal .community, which feared it might presage a
fundamental alteration in the traditional attorney-client rela-
tionship. 62 But while it indeed appears that attorneys will be ex-
pected to assume a distinct responsibility to the public in the se-
58 Id.
59 Id.
'° Id,
61 ' Complaint, supra note 45, at 91,913-17.
62
 The [NSMC] suit shocked lawyers across the nation because it indicated the
[C]ommission believes a lawyer has an obligation, beyond protecting his client's
interests, to protect the public interest if he learns the client is acting illegally. If, in a
securities matter, the lawyer' can't convince the client to stop illegal conduct, he
shOuld withdraw from the case and possibly notify the SEC, according to the
[C]ommission view. If the attorney doesn't do this, he also is violating the law, the
SEC feels.
Some lawyers object that this view puts them in the role of policeman rather
than advocate and jeopardizes the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship.
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 14, 1974, at 13, cols. 2-3. Some commentators have expressed
similar fears,See, e.g., Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. Law. 1153
(1972):
The [NSMC] action is significant and unprecedented not only because it is the first•
such action against a major law firm, but even more importantly because it posits
novel theories as to the duties and obligations of lawyers, which would appear to
significantly expand their liabilities.
Id. However, whether the theories are indeed "novel" is questionable. For a .discussion of
attorneys' duties to report their clients' frauds, see Freeman, Opinion Letters and Profes-
sionalism, 1973 Duke L. J. 371, 431-33.
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curities area, the effect of enforcing this responsibility, once these
new standards become established and clients realize that they can
no longer shop for an attorney who is willing to close his eyes to an
illegal course of action, will likely be a salutary one of raising the
standards of securities practice rather than jeopardizing the
confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship.
However, assuming that an attorney does indeed have newly
enforced responsibilities to the public, there remains the question of
the standard of culpability to which to hold him. Commissioner
Sommer noted in his speech that what was disturbing about the
Second Circuit decision in Spectrum was not the fact that an attor-
ney was involved, but the suggestion "that simple negligence in the
rendering of an opinion concerning exemption from registration
might expose counsel at least to Commission injunctive action."" It
is submitted that such fears may be unfounded, at least on the basis
of the holding in Spectrum, and that the apparent imposition of a
"negligence" standard 'is in reality nothing more than an application
of the scienter standard already recognized by the Second Circuit, a
standard which falls decidedly short of "simple negligence."
Scienter is a slippery term that has been defined at various
times as actual knowledge, intent, bad faith, recklessness and even
negligence. 65 Although the traditional scienter requirement in com-
mon law fraud actions encompassed only actual knowledge, the
generally accepted modern standard has been expanded to include
at least constructive knowledge—a "should have known"
standard. 66 And even though it is generally accepted that a nominal
negligence standard may be applied in an SEC injunctive suit, 67 it is
•
63 Sommer, supra note 40, at 83,688 (emphasis added).
" The term "simple negligence" as used by Commissioner Sommer probably means
"ordinary negligence," which has been defined as "a slight want of ordinary care." W.
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 183 (4th ed, 1971). However, Prosser also notes: "The
prevailing view is that there are no 'degrees' of care or negligence, as a matter of law; there
are only different amounts of care as a matter of fact . , ." Id. at 182. Since it is submitted
that the standard of culpability applied in Spectrum is in fact a scienter standard, it is
unnecessary for the purposes of this note to try to differentiate among degrees of negligence, to
the extent that such distinctions survive.
65 2 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud—SEC Rule 10b-5, § 8.4(501) (1973). See also 3
L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1432 (2d ed. 1961).
66 See Note, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1070, 1075-76, 1079 n.43 (1965),
65 In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963), the
Supreme Court emphasized that
Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operates "as a
fraud or deceit" upon a client, did not intend to require proof of intent to injure and
actual injury to the client. Congress intended .. . securities legislation [, having
been] "enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds," [to be construed] not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.
[Footnote omitted.] This language has been widely , interpreted as allowing something less than
a strict scienter standard of culpability in SEC injunctive suits. See 2 A. Bromberg, supra
note 65, § 8.4(585)(6). The question of whether to apply scienter or negligence standards to
private civil actions, as distinguished from SEC injunctive actions, is the subject of debate
both within and among the circuits. For discussions of the problem, see Bucklo, Scienter and
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not at all clear that in this context negligence means anything more
in practice than some form of scienter. It would be simplistic to
pretend that scienter and negligence do not overlap; at the very least
they have.a hazy interface. Negligent failure to obtain knowledge
has been equated with constructive knowledge." Thus, conduct
falling between strict scienter and simple negligence, but fitting
some scienter standard, can be termed "negligent," and in fact has
been so termed by the Second Circuit. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul-
phur Co., 69 cited by the court in Spectrum as standing for "the
negligence standard which we have repeatedly held to be sufficient
in the context of enforcement proceedings seeking equitable or
prophylactic relief,"" the Second Circuit set its standard of culpabil-
ity as regards an SEC injunctive suit brought under Rule 10b-5:
Absent any clear indication of a legislative intention to
require a showing of specific fraudulent intent, . . . the
securities laws should be interpreted as an expansion of the
common law both to effectuate the broad remedial design
of Congress, . . . and to insure uniformity of enforcement
. . . . Moreover, a review of other sections of the Act from
which Rule 10b-5 seems to have been drawn suggests that
the implementation of a standard of conduct that encom-
passes negligence as well as active fraud comports with the
administrative and the legislative purposes underlying the
Rule. Finally, we note that this position. is not, as asserted
by defendants, irreconcilable with previous language in
this circuit because "some form of the traditional scienter
requirement," . .. sometimes defined as "fraud," . . is
preserved. This requirement, whether it be termed lack of
diligence, constructive , fraud, or unreasonable or negligent
Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 562 (1972); Mann, Rule 106-5: Evolution of a Continuum of
Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1206
(1970); 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 65, § 8.4(585). For further discussion, with emphasis on
disagreement within a circuit, see Comment, Lanza v. Drexel & Co. and Rule 10b-5:
Approaching the Scienter Controversy in Private Actions, IS B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 526
(1974).
Some cases have discussed whether the, language of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, with its
emphasis on manipulative and deceptive devices, can support a negligence standard, but it
has been generally accepted that in fact it can in suits for equitable or prophylactic relief. See,
e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (concurring
opinion).
68
 "Negligent failure to obtain knowledge is equivalent to constructive knowledge." 2 A.
Bromberg, supra note 65, § 8.4(582). Bromberg cites Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 914 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969), in which the Second Circuit stated that, at least
on the question of the sufficiency of the complaints, "Mlle charge that defendants 'knew or
should have known' adequately alleges actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements . .."
69 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), on remand,
312 F. Supp. 77 (S,D.N.Y. 1970), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part & remanded, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir. 1971).
70 489 F.2d at 541.
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conduct,. remains implicit in this standard, a standard that
promotes the deterrence objective of the Rule.''
The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur was dealing with corporate
insiders who, among other things, bought their company's stock
immediately prior to dissemination to the public of information
describing a rich mineral strike by the company. Although the
insiders claimed that they were justified because they honestly be-
lieved the news had become public, the court found that their belief
was not reasonable under the circumstances. 72 The finding of un-
reasonable belief was grounded in "some form of the traditional
scienter requirement." 73 Put another way, the defendants should
have known that the information had not yet become public. This
standard of constructive knowledge, although not expressed as such,
was also implicitly relied upon in the two other cases cited in
Spectrum as representing the "negligence" standard to be applied in
SEC enforcement proceedings. 74
Thus, when Schiffman's actions are examined in light of the
Second Circuit's language in Texas Gulf Sulphur, it is apparent that
his failure to check to see if the information in Berger's letters was in
fact correct can fit either "lack of diligence" or "unreasonable or
negligent conduct."75 This standard, although articulated in terms
of "negligent conduct," is actually a form of constructive knowledge
when viewed in the context of the case, and fits more closely a
scienter standard than a traditional "simple negligence" standard,
which has no requirement of scienter in any form.
In conclusion, the Spectrum decision need not be the source of
any major discomfiture within the legal community. Seen as a
decision rendered closely upon the facts, Spectrum sets no trap into
which a reasonably conscientious securities lawyer will be likely to
fall, since Schiffman's actions were conspicuously imprudent. As the
Second Circuit pointed out, Schiffman could have protected himself
through the simple expedient of including a caveat in his opinion
letter to condition its contents. 76 And although the Second Circuit
73 401 F.2d at 855 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted).
74 Id. at 856.
73 Id. at 855.
74 See SEC. v. Manor Nursing Centers, Ide., 458 F.2d 1082, 1097 (2d Cir. 1972)
(beneficiaries of stock sale should have discovered that stock sate was not fully subscribed as
required), and Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1969) (brokers violated duty to
investigate stock they sold), cited in Spectrum, 489 F.2d at 541.
73 401 F.2d at 855 (emphasis added).
76 [W]here expediency precludes thorough investigation, an attorney can prevent the
illicit use of his opinion letter by prohibiting its utilization in the sale of unregistered
securities by a statement to that effect clearly appearing on the face of the letter.
489 F.2d at 542. See Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions—An Attempt to Bring
Some Order out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. Law. 915 (1973).
If there is truth in Berger's claim that he warned Schiffman that the stock was going to
be traded by a control person, Schiffman's failure to heed such a warning would have been a
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was correct in characterizing its standard of culpability as one
"repeatedly held to be sufficient in the context of enforcement pro-
ceedings seeking equitable or prophylactic relief," 77 it may have
been misleading in characterizing the standard as "negligence" since
the concept of scienter has been expanded by the Second Circuit in
previous decisions to include- the "negligent" action of Schiffman in
Spectrum.
RANDOLPH H. ELKINS
Antitrust Law—Class Actions—Tolling of Federal Statutes of
Limitations—American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,'—On
June 19, 1964, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California found American Pipe & Construction Com-
pany and five other steel and concrete pipe companies 2 guilty of
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.' Four days later, the United
States filed civil complaints against the same six companies which,
as amended, sought to recover damages and to restrain further
violations of sections of the Sherman, 4 Clayton 5 and False Claims€
Acts. 7
 On May 24, 1968, a negotiated "final judgment" was entered
against the companies. 8
On May 13, 1969, the State of Utah instituted a civil antitrust
suit against the same defendant pipe companies, 9 seeking treble
damages for violations of section 1 - of the Sherman Act. The com-
plaint, which was based on the same events as those involved in the
government's, suits, was brought in the United States District Court
reckless disregard of available information and probably culpable under the strictest scienter
standard.
77
 489 F.2d at 541.
1
 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
2
 The other five companies indicted were United Concrete Pipe Corp., Kaiser Steel
Corp., United States Steel Corp., United States Industries, and Smith-Scott, Inc. Maricopa
County v, American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp. 77, 79 (0. Ariz. 1969).
I 15 U.S.C. 1 (1970). The indictments alleged that the six companies had combined
and conspired to restrain interstate trade by submitting collusive and rigged bids for the sale
of pipe and had divided the business thus obtained among themselves. 414 U.S. at 540.
4 15 U.S.C. 4 (1970).
15 U.S.C. 15(a) (1970).
6
 31 U.S.C. 231 (1970).
7
 303 F. Supp. at 80.
Id. In Maricopa County, the district court determined that although five of the
defendant pipe companies settled their suits with the government on Dec. 8, 1967, and a
"partial final judgment" was entered which was, for all practical purposes, a final judgment
against all the defendants except American Pipe, the conspiracy linking the companies
together required that the "final judgment" as to all of the defendants not be entered until the
case of the last defendant, American Pipe, was terminated on May 24, 1968. Id. at 87.
9
 Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Cal. 1969). In addition to
the six companies involved in the government's suits, Utah also named Utah Concrete Pipe
Co. and W.R. White Co. as defendants in the case. Id.
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